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THE CANADIAN BAR REVIEW [VOL . XLIX
Clark and King are clearly more satisfactory than the result reached
by Megarry J. in Leary."
DAVID J. MULLAN*
CONFLICT OF LAWS-TORTS-TIME FOR A CHANGE.-In La Van
v. Danyluk and Danyluk,' Kirke Smith J, of the Supreme Court
of British Columbia again examined the conflict of laws rules ap-
plicable to torts committed abroad . His decision is an important
one as he believed himself to be bound by precedent to follow the
opinion of the Supreme Court of Canada in McLean v. Petti-
grew' which adopted the views expressed in Machado v. Fontes,'
instead of the opinion of the majority of the Law Lords in Boys v.
ss Supra, footnote 5. Since this comment was originally written, this
issue has again come before the Canadian courts. In Re Chromex Nickel
Mines Ltd. (1970), 16 D.L.R . (3d) 273, the British Columbia Court of
Appeal was called upon to decide the question in a context very similar to
that in which it was raised in Re Clark and Ontario Securities Commission,
supra, footnote 2. Once again it was decided that a subsequent fair hearing
on appeal could cure earlier defects of natural justice at first instance .
Leary was discussed at some length in the judgment of Bull J.A . (with
whom McFarlane J.A . concurred) but was distinguished on the basis that
the appeals council of the Trade Union was only purporting to exercise
appellate jurisdiction while the Securities Commission in this case possessed
powers of hearing and making orders itself . The appellate tribunals in
King v. University of Saskatchewan, supra, footnote 1, and Re Clark and
Ontario Securities Commission had similar dual capacities . There is, of
course, a certain logic in the distinction drawn between the three Canadian
cases and Leary. Nevertheless, it is unfortunate that a Canadian court has
once again missed the opportunity of dealing with the real issues raised
by this problem, issues that were at least considered by Megarry J. in
Leary.
The issue was also dealt with by the Supreme Court of Nova Scotia
in O'Laughlin v. Halifax Longshoremen's Association (1970), 15 D.L.R .
(3d) 316, where Hart J. held, without discussion of the authorities or
principles, that an appeal conducted by a meeting of the general member-
ship of a Trade Union in accord with the rules of natural justice overcame
earlier defects of natural justice in O'Laughlin's original suspension from
the Union by the Executive Board.
* David J. Mullan, LL.M. (Vict.) .
1 (1970), 75 W.W.R . 500 (B.C .S.C .) .z [19451 S.C.R . 62, [19451 2 D.L.R . 65 . ". . . In order to succeed, the
plaintiff must establish in the first place that the quasi-delict committed in
Ontario would have given rise to an action for damages in Quebec, if it
had been committed in this latter Province. In the second place he must
also show that the act with which the driver is charged is, to use the ex-
pression of the authors, `wrongful', i.e . `non justifiable' according to the
law o£ the place where the quasi-delict was committed" . Per Taschereau J.,
at pp. 76-77 (D.L.R.) .' "The innocency of the act in the foreign country is an answer to the
action, That is what is meant when it is said that the act must be `justifiable'
by the law of the place where it was done ." [18971 2 Q.B . 231, per Rigby




Chaplin' who held that Phillips v. Eyre' had laid down a double
actionability rule .'
Kirke Smith J. would have preferred to apply the proper law of
the tort doctrine' which he had first adopted in Gronlund v. Han-
sen' only to find it rejected by the British Columbia Court of Ap-
peal.'
The facts of La Van v. IDanyluk and Danylukl° are quite simple.
The action arose out of a collision which took place in the State
of Washington between two automobiles both registered; licensed
and insured in British Columbia . All the parties to the litigation
had their residence and domicile in this province. The plaintiff,
who was contributorily negligent, claimed damages for injuries he
received as a result of the collision. The court had to determine
the law applicable to the questions of liability and quantum of
damages .
1[n the State of Washington, contributory negligence is a com-
plete defense to an action in tort whereas this is not the case in
British Columbia.
Since the plaintiff was contributorily negligent, the defendant
driver's negligent conduct was not actionable in the State of Wash-
ington. To maintain his action in British Columbia, the plaintiff
had to prove either that the proper law of the tort was the law of
this province or that, under McLean v. Pettigrew, the defendant
driver's conduct was unjustifiable in the State of Washington and
actionable in British Columbia . His Lordship was faced with a
4 [19691 3 W.L.R. 322, 119691 2 All E.R. 1085, [19711 A.C. 356.
$ "First, the wrong must be of such a character that it would have been
actionable if committed in England. . . . Secondly, the act must not have
been justifiable by the law of the place where it was done." (1870), L.R .
6 Q.B . 1, at pp. 28-29.e A tort committed abroad may be sued upon in England if it is action-
able, i.e . the subject of a civil remedy both by the lex fori and the lex loci
delicti.
' Meaning the law with which the parties and the act done have the most
significant connection. Per Lord Denning M.R., in Boys v. Chaplin, [19681
2 Q.B . 1, [196812 W.L.R. 328, [19681 1 All E.R . 283, at p. 290 (C.A.) and
in the House of Lords, per Lord Hodson, at pp. 330-331 (W.L.R .) and Lord
Wilberforce, at pp . 391-392 (A.C.), supra, footnote 4. Also Lord Denning
M.R., in Sayers v. International, Drilling Co . N.V ., [19711 3 All E.R. 163,
[19711 1 W.L.R . 1176, at p. 110 (C.A.) : "In considering that claim, we
must apply the proper law of tort, that is, the law of the country with
which the parties and the acts have the most significant connection."
8 (1968), 65 W.W.R . 485, 69 D.L.R. (2d) 598. Also G.A . Biggar (1969),
27 U. of T. Fac. L. Rev. 138.
'The decision of the Supreme Court of British Columbia was affirmed
using the conventional approach : (1969), 68 W.W.R. 329, 4 D.L.R . (3d)
435. The Court of Appeal relied on Canadian National Steamships Co .
Ltd . v . Watson, [19391 S.C.R . 11, which in turn applied the formula of
Phillips v. Eyre (the act must not have been justifiable by the law of the
place where it was committed) . Reference was also made to McLean v .
Pettigrew, supra, footnote 2.io Supra, footnote 1.
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true conflicts situation."
By finding that the defendant driver was, on the overwhelming
preponderance of evidence, driving in excess of the permitted night
speed limit on the highway where the collision occurred, a punish
able offence by the law of the State of Washington, he was forced,
on the authority of McLean v. Pettigrew, to give judgment in favour
of the plaintiff since the defendant driver's negligence was action-
able in British Columbia . Had he applied the test laid down by
the House of Lords in Boys v. Chaplin, a different result would
have been reached although it might not necessarily have been a
just result in the circumstances of the particular case.
Kirke Smith J.'s decision would have been the same if he had
used the proper law of the tort doctrine . In fact the court, by giving
relief to the plaintiff, effected the policy expressed by the law of
British Columbia . In the circumstances, this province had a much
greater interest in applying its policy and thus its laws than the
State of Washington ." His Lordship recognized that his task had
not been an easy one: i3
I confess to having been deeply concerned in arriving at this con-
clusion, for although it accords both with the authorities binding on
me, as I understand them, and also with the "proper law of the tort"
concept which attracts my respect, albeit insignificant support, it
clashes with the view expressed by the majority of the House of
Lords in the Chaplin case . Here, I am of the opinion that there was
clear contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff. By Washing-
ton law, as I have it in evidence before me, this is a complete bar
to his action for damages. The defendant driver's contributory neg-
ligence is therefore, by Washington law, not actionable, and it fol-
lows that the plainti Ts action could not be maintained in the courts
of that state or this province.
I hasten to add that my concern is for the state of the law, and not
as to the practical consequences in this case, for the result at which I
have thus far arrived, that the law of this province applies to the
issues of liability and quantum, appears to me to accord with the
realities of the situation.
Mr. Justice Kirke Smith cannot be criticized for applying the
law of British Columbia since, as he said, it accords with the real-
ities of the situation . However, those who share his concern for the
state of the law will regret that he did not take this opportunity
again to depart from precedent in the hope that, this time, the
British Columbia Court of Appeal and eventually the Supreme
Court of Canada might be prepared to reconsider McLean v. Pet-
tigrew . Whatever opinion one may have on the question of which
conflict of laws rules should be applicable to foreign torts, I be-
lieve that there is a consensus that the concept of "unjustifiability"
"See P.K. Westen, False Conflicts (1967), 55 Cal. L. Rev. 74 .
12 See Currie, Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws
(1959), 8 Duke L. J. 171, at pp. 177-178.




as explained in Machado v. Pontes andMcLean v. Pettigrew should
be discarded.
I do not intend to review the arguments advanced in favour
of or against the several possible conflicts rules in the field of torts.
thers have already done this admirably and at great length in the
pages of this Review" and elsewhere." However, without suggest-
ing that we should blindly follow decisions of the House of Lords
in common law matters, I believe that Boys v. Chaplin represents
a definite step forward that merits serious and prompt considera-
tion by our courts in order to avoid forum shopping and its result-
ing uncertainties." There are, of course, other possible solutions
which also deserve the attention of the legal profession . The doc-
trine of the proper law of the tort is one of them." Furthermore
some recent developments should be noted. For instance, in Que-
bec, the Private International Law Committee of the Office of Re-
vision of the Civil Code has proposed the following rule :"
Extra contractual civil liability is governed by the law of the habitual
residence of the plaintiff at the time when the act which caused the
damage occurred . However, the defendant may raise a defense based
on the lawfulness of the act which caused the damage and the absence
of an obligation to repair it according to the law of the place where
this act occurred .
The lex loci delicti commissi is rejected as a general principle.
The law of the habitual residence of the plaintiff-victim is ap-
plicable subject to a certain form of control exercised by the lex
loci delicti and tempered by public policy . The victim must obtain
the type of compensation to which he is entitled at the place where
he resides habitually when he suffered his injury .
This new approach, if adopted by the Quebec Legislature, might
14 See e.g . M.G . Baer, Conflict of Laws-Torts-A Blind Search for a
"Proper" Law (1970), 48 Can. Bar Rev. 161 .
11 L. Lazar, Phillips v. Eyre Revisited (1969), 32 Mod. L. Rev. 638 ;
Harvey McGregor, The International Accident Problem (1970), 33 Mod.
L. Rev. 1 reprinted in (1971), 19 Chitty L. J. 187; P.M . North, P.P.H .
Webb, I.G.F. Karsten, Foreign Torts and English Courts (1970), 19 Int.
& Comp. L.Q . 24.is For a criticism of the double actionability rule see M.G . Baer, op cit.,
footnote 14, at pp. 164-168.
11 In the United States see Restatement of Law, Conflict of Laws, 2nd,
Proposed Official Draft, Part II (1968), s. 145. For a proposal that is very
close to the American doctrine of the proper law of the tort, see Conference
of Commissioners on Uniformity of Legislation in Canada, Tentative
First Draft of a Foreign Torts Act: 1966 Proceedings 58 and M. Hancock,
Canadian-American Torts in the Conflict of Laws . The Revival of Policy-
Determined Construction Analysis (1968), 46 Can. Bar Rev. 226 and H.E .
Read, What Should Be the Law in Canada Governing Conflict of Laws in
Torts (1968), 1 Can. Legal Studies 277; LA.C. Smith, The Foreign Torts
Act : Look Before you Leap (1970), 20 U. of T. L. J. 81 .
18 J.-G. Castel, P.=A. Cr6peau, International Developments in Choice of
Law Governing Torts (1971), 19 Am. J. of Comp . L. 17, at p. 33 .
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eliminate the uncertainty that has crept into the law of this prov-
ince . Although in O'Connor v. Wray" the Supreme Court of Can-
ada held that the conflicts rule applicable in the Province of Que-
bec to foreign torts was the same as that in force in the common
law provinces, Quebec courts have not always followed this view .
In some instances, relying on article 6, paragraph 3, of the Civil
Code, they have applied the lex loci delicti" although, more re-
cently, they seem to have followed McLean v. Pettigrew . 21
Attempts have also been made to reconcile the doctrine of the
proper law of the tort with the application of the lex loci delicti .
Thus, in 1969, the Institut de Droit international resolved that,
on principle, tort liability should be governed by the law of the
place where the tort is committed, it being understood that the
tort is regarded as having been committed at the place with which,
in the light of all the facts connecting a tort with a given place
(from the beginning of the tortious conduct to the infliction of the
loss), the situation is most closely connected."
In a more general way, it has been suggested that the time
has come for the adoption of an international Standard of Damages
comparable to that used in claims for state responsibility in public
international law."
Actually, as a result of technical developments, the courts and
the legislatures should realize that it is no longer possible to have
only one general rule of conflict of laws in the field of foreign torts .
Traffic accidents, products liability, defamation, invasion of pri-
vacy and other types of wrongful conduct require special conflicts
rules as the issues they raise are not always of the same nature.
These differences have been recognized by the Conference of Com-
missioners on Uniformity of Legislation in Canada which, in 1970,
adopted and recommended for enactment a model Conflict of Laws
(Traffic Accidents) Act"" based on the 1968 Hague Convention
on the Law Applicable to Traffic Accidents." The purpose of the
Convention is to determine the law applicable to civil non-con-
tractual liability arising from traffic accidents involving one or more
vehicles, whether motorized or not, on public highways, grounds
19 [19301 S.C.R . 231, [19301 2 D.L.R . 899.
10 See P.-A. Crépeau, De la responsabilité civile extracontractuelle en
droit international privé Qu6becois (1961), 39 Can. Bar Rev. 3 and cases
cited therein.
"Gagnon v. Benoit, [1970] C.S . 395; also Dame St-Pierre v. Dame
McGraw, [1960] B.R. 998; Dame Friedland v. Feig (1971), unreported,
Montreal No . 760.692.
22 See (1971), 18 Am. J. of Comp. L. 4. Also J.-G. Castel, P.-A.
Cr6peau, op. cit., footnote 18, at p. 34 .
23 B.A . Wortley (1971), 20 Int. & Comp . L. Q. 586.
241970 Proceedings 263. See also the excellent report accompanying
the Model Act; prepared by Mr. Hugo Fischer, at p. 215 et seq.
2s For an analysis of the Convention, see J.G. Castel, P.-A. Cr6peau,





open to the public, or private grounds to which certain persons
have access . The basic principle of the Convention is that the
internal law of the state where the accident occurred is to be ap-
plied. However, there are many exceptions to this principle : thus,
according to articles 4,'S and 6, in certain cases, the internal law
of the state where the vehicles are registered or, if they have no
registration or are registered in several states, the internal law of
the state in which they are habitually stationed, together with, in
other cases, the habitual residence of a person involved, will be
applied.
The Convention and the model Act attempt to provide a rea-
sonable compromise between the lex loci delicti and the proper
law of the tort doctrine . Since the double actionability rule favoured
by the House of Lords does not appear to be very desirable in
traffic accidents cases in Canada, the adoption of the model Con-
flict of Laws (Traffic Accidents) Act should be supported by the
legal profession . This does not mean that Machado v. Fontes and
McLean v. Pettigrew should not be overruled. These cases have
been heavily criticized here and in England mostly on the ground
that the rule they laid down encourages forum shopping and
does not promote uniformity, certainty and predictability of
results. Every opportunity should be taken by the lower courts
to force the Supreme Court of Canada to develop new and revolu-
tionary conflicts rules in the field of foreign torts." There is no
reason why in Canada there could not exist side by side a general
common law rule, which might well be the double actionability
rule, and several specially designed conflicts rules to cover traffic
accidents, products liability, defamation and other types of wrong-
ful acts .
Modern conditions and technology have given tort liability in
the conflict of laws a prominence which can only increase with the
years to come . It is thus of vital importance that old concepts be
reexamined in the light of our new ways of life in order to reflect
contemporary society in Canada . Blindly to adhere to precedent
in the light of the ever increasing rate of change in our society is
tantamount to legal suicide. If the law lags behind, unbearable
social stresses will develop. In the field of foreign torts, as in other
fields, the courts should strive to update outmoded common law
conflicts rules." Our legislatures should also seriously consider the
as Pehaps, the Supreme Court may be prevailed upon to adopt the,
same attitude as the House of Lords with respect to its previous decisions .
See Practice Statement (H.L.) (Judicial Precedent), [1966] 1 W.L.R . 1234 .s' See Diplock L. J . in dndyka v. dndyka, [1966] 3 W.L.R. 603, at p . 615
(C.A.) : "It is the function of the courts to mould the common law and
to adapt it to the changing society for which it provides the rules of each
man's duty to his neighbour . . . . And within the limits that we are at
liberty to do so, let us adapt the common law in a way that makes common
sense to the common man."
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adoption of the Conflict of Laws (Traffic Accidents) Act. Finally,
the legal profession should study with great interest the Draft Con-
vention on Products Liability in the Conflicts of Laws, recently
adopted by a Special Commission of the Hague Conference on
Private International Law," as this draft will be one of the topics
to be discussed at the Twelfth Session of the Hague Conference
on Private International Law to be held in the fall of 1972 .
The law must not be focussed backward but forward. As Àndré
Gide once wrote : "Man cannot discover new oceans unless he has
the courage to lose sight of the shore."
J.-G. CASTEL
28 Canada is a member of the Conference. In article 3, the Draft Con-
vention adopts as a general principle the application of the internal law of
the state of the habitual residence at the time of the accident of the person
directly injured by the product provided the product or products of the
same origin and the same type were available in that state through com-
mercial channels with the consent, express or implied, of the person sought
to be held liable . Exceptions are provided in articles 4 and 5. See Pre-
liminary Document No. 5 of July 1971 .
